# INVESTMENT STRATEGY OUTLOOK - LARGE CAP EQUITY 

Quarter Ended J une 30, 2006

TheJ unequarter was volatile but in theend, little changed for stocks. TheFMI Iarge cap portfol ios were up fractionally in theJ une period, bringing the cal endar year-to-date performance to a gain of approximately $4 \%-5 \%$. The Standard \& Poor's 500 I ndex declined $1.4 \%$ in the quarter and was up $2.7 \%$ on the year. Investors' fears about interest rates, inflation and the economy seemed to fuel the turnaround in the market from a relatively robust March quarter. Several of the speculative areas we cited in the March letter, particularly industrial cyclicals and commodities, fell substantially in the quarter. Stocks that helped the FMI portfolios in the J une quarter included Aramark, who announced plans to go private, K roger, and Kimberly Clark. Equities that detracted fromtheresults included Cardinal Health, Comerica and TJ X Companies. TheBank of New Y ork and Sprint Nextel were added to the portfol io in the quarter.

Themarket seemed tohave a schizophrenic naturethroughout theJ unequarter. Oneday, investors would fret theBernankeF ed and the prospect of higher rates tofight nascent inflation. Thenext day, ostensibly due to a piece of news such as a weaker-than-expected payroll number, the market would rally. A third theme had the economy lurching toward recession. Vol atility picked up significantly after the relative calm of the past two years, as one might imagine. Such increased volatility, combined with what is shaping up to be a record year of merger and acquisition (M\&A) activity, historically portends market peaks. Of course, volatility could substantially increasefrom hereand the deal cal endar could get even busier, which could lead to a big rally in the market. From 19961999, we thought the combination of high volatility, frenetic M\&A, and silly valuations would send themarket lower. By 2000 we were right, but it is a reminder that thesethings happen on their own timeschedule. Having said this, it is difficult to imaginethat investors could gol ooney again so soon after the last debacle.

Twice each year we makesome big picture comments. Below area few thoughts on theeconomy and housing, as well as what we believe is an interesting historical review of valuations.

## The Economy

Real Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) expanded at a surprisingly strong5.6\%in thefirst quarter. With high gasolineand energy prices, and generally higher prices overall, combined with a slowing of the home equity cash-out-to-spend cycle, one would not haveanticipated this sort of number. But in the short run, anything is possible, and it is instructive to remember that the first quarter undoubtedly rebounded off a weak (hurricane aftermath) December quarter. Therewere certainly plenty of signs pointing to a slower growth rate in the J une quarter. Auto and home sales slowed and many consumer-related stocks have signaled weaker results. On J une 29, The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, after raising the Fed Funds Rate to $5.25 \%$, said, "...indicators suggest that economic growth is moderating from its quite strong pace earlier this year." Although the market rallied in theface of this seventeenth consecutiveratehike on thetheory that theF ed might be done raising rates, the gray-haired among us shuddered to contemplaterising rates, escalating inflation, and a weakening economy. These circumstances harken back to the stagflation days in the 1970s and early 1980s. While we are a long way from such an environment, the fact that pundits have started talking about it suggests that the so-called Gol dilocks economy of thelast several years may bea thing of the past. It is certainly ironicthat Mr. Bernankefinds himself battling inflation demons
when just a few short years ago as a Fed governor, he talked about dropping dollar bills from a helicopter to forestall deflation! We do not see inflation getting out of hand, primarily because of international labor arbitrage keeping wages in check.

Wereiterateour opinion fromsix months agothat weseeslower growth ahead, particularly from the standpoint of consumer spending. Inflation in May was $4.2 \%$ on a year-over-year basis and even the "core" rate, which excludes food and energy, was $2.4 \%$. Real discretionary income appears to be falling. Payroll growth seems to have stopped improving and wages ( $+3.8 \%$ ) are not keeping pace with inflation. Consumer borrowing rates and mortgage interest rates are rising. Merrill Lynch estimates that over $60 \%$ of 2005 consumer spending growth was the result of mortgage equity withdrawal. That conduit has obviously diminished in 2006. All of these items can changequickly, but for the time being, the economy looks like it will be weaker in the months ahead.

## Energy

In our letter dated December 31, 2005, we said that we thought oil had peaked, and thefundamentals supported a lower price, but that hasn't stopped crudefrom rising another \$10 in thelast six months! Crudeinventories arenow at a 20-year high. Consumption growth has fallen. Accordingto BP'schief economist, worldwide demand growth in 2005 decelerated to $2.7 \%$ from $4.4 \%$ in 2004. U.S. consumption was down $0.1 \%$ in 2005, the first time since 1985 that the U.S. experienced aboveaverageGDP growth and declining energy consumption. Chineseenergy consumption grew $9.5 \%$ in 2005 compared to $15.5 \%$ in 2004 despite economic growth of close to $10 \%$ in both years. Price sends a signal tothemarket and weareseeing conservation and efficiency measurestaking hold. Spending for exploration and refining is increasing dramatically. Eventually this should mean lower energy prices. Natural gas inventories are over $30 \%$ above levels of a year ago and over $60 \%$ higher than thefive-year average. With this market being more regional in natureand perhaps not as sensitive as oil is to terrorism concerns, prices have fallen approximately $50 \%$ over the past six months.

## Housing

Signs of a housing slowdown are now widely prevalent. Prices in some of the hottest markets have al ready declined 10-20\%. TheN ational Association of Realtors' figures show declines of 10\% or more in 25 of the top 150 markets between October 2005 and April 2006. Inventories are up substantially and time to close transactions has stretched significantly. The current inventory levels of new $(570,000)$ and existing ( 3.38 million) homes for sale is $64 \%$ and $66 \%$ above their 10 -year average of 344,000 and 2.03 million units, respectively. Housingstarts began fallinglatelast year and although the month-to-month numbers jump around considerably, they are down by double digits in 2006. Historically, new sales have been a leading indicator of existing home sales, a much larger market. There have been ten down housing cycles in the past fifty years. According to Merrill Lynch, on average, housingstarts drop 42\%during thesedown periods, and theduration of thecyclesis roughly two years. In seven of these ten cycles, the downturn foreshadowed a recession.

## Valuation

In the December letter, we discussed long-term valuation measurements and the character of the corresponding histograms. We mentioned that these histograms were not smooth bell curves, but rather more randomly distributed. If anything, the valuation distributions were more "barbell" in nature. We'd like to follow up on that commentary by depicting four popular valuation measurements graphically. We would alsolike tothank The Leuthold Group for permission to use this data. The first three histograms use the Standard \& Poor's (S\&P) Industrials - formerly the S\&P 400 Industrials - which arethenonfinancial companies in theS\&P 500. Data on the price-to-book (book value ratio) multiple, price-to-earnings multiple and market value-to-GDP histograms goes back to

1926 and the price-to-sales data goes back to 1956. Although the print is necessarily small to fit in this letter, full size reproductions will soon be made available on our website, at www.fiduciarymgt.com.

Each quarter constitutes a data point. For example, in the first histogram, price-to-book value, the farthest data point to the left, and thus the cheapest, is $32-2$, which is in the .40 column. In other words, in the second quarter of 1932, stocks sold at 40\% of their book value. On March 31, 2006 (the latest data point available), stocks sold at $290 \%$ of their book value. Each histogram has a corresponding valuation distribution table, divided by deciles. The current book multiple is in the ninth decile. It is interesting to note the shape of all of the histograms. In no case, and in no other valuation measure that we studied, is there a classic normal distribution. If anything, the distributions are more bimodal in nature, which is not surprising when you think about the stock market. The stock market tends to go through periods of excessive optimism and excessive pessimism. There is nothing magical about the median; it is just another plot on the graph. Valuations tend to cluster totheright, "expensive," or theleft, "cheap." Thus, looking at the left side of the graph wegenerally seethe 1930s, 1940s and 1970s. On the right side arethe 1990s and 2000s.


The price-to-earnings histogram is very similar, although you will see many data points from the 1930s on theright side. This is duetotheutter collapse of corporate earnings during the depression, thus creating high price-to-earnings ratios. Theseoutliers havebeen circled. Notethebarbell shape and the fact that the March 31 data point is also in the ninth decile. Due to the inherent volatility in earnings, The Leuthold Group uses a five-year normalizing procedure. Again, further information about the methodol ogy will be available on our website.


The price-to-sales (market capitalization divided by annual revenue) histogram only goes back to 1956 but it is probably the truest representation of underlying value, simply because revenues are much more consistent than either earnings or book value. Here we see the 1970s and early 1980s clustered to the left and the 1990s and 2000s to the right. It is no surprise that this measure is also in the ninth decile.

| ```S\&P INDUSTRIALS PRICE/SALES RATIO 1956 TO DATE QUARTERLY DATA 201 QUARTERS``` |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | PRICE/SALES RATIO 1956 TO DATE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ecile Dis ecile Decile ecile Decile | tributio Belo 0.47 0.56 0.70 | 0.47 <br> to 0.56 <br> to 0.70 <br> to 0.82 |  | Stocks Cheap |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | NOW | Fifth <br> Sixth <br> Seven <br> Eighth <br> -Ninth <br> Tenth | cile <br> ecile <br> h Decile <br> Decile <br> Decile <br> Decile | 0.76 0.82 0.91 1.01 1.08 1.21 1.44 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { to } 0.0 .91 \\ & \text { to } 1.01 \\ & \text { to } 1.08 \\ & \text { to } 1.21 \\ & \text { to } 1.44 \\ & \text { and ab } \end{aligned}$ | ve | Stocks <br> Expensive |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  $\begin{array}{c}\text { Median } \\ \text { 0.93-2 }\end{array}$    <br> 0.91 $35-3$    |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 96-2 \\ & 68-3 \\ & 68-2 \\ & 67-4 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { March } 31 \\ 1.35 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | Median: 0.91 <br> Average: 0.88 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 82-4 |  | 85-4 |  |  | 91-1 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 93-1 \\ & 92-4 \end{aligned}$ | 95-1 | $0$ | $73-1$ $72-3$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | High Quartile: 1.14 and above Low Quartile: 0.64 and below |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 81-2 | 85-1 | 85-3 |  |  | 90-3 |  | 92-3 | 94-3 |  | 72-1 |  | 96-3 | 67-3 |  | 66-1 |  |  | 06-1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 81-1 | 84-4 | 85-2 |  |  | 90-2 |  | 92-2 | 94-2 | 95-2 | 71-3 |  | 96-1 | 67-2 |  | 65-4 |  |  | 05-4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 81-4 | 80-4 | 84-3 | 83-4 |  |  | 90-1 |  | 92-1 | 94-1 | 87-3 | 71-1 | 95-4 | 69-2 | 66-2 |  | 65-2 |  |  | 05-3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 81-3 | 80-3 | 84-2 | 83-3 |  |  | 89-2 |  | 91-3 | 93-4 | 71-4 | 69-4 | 72-4 | 69-1 | 63-3 |  | 65-1 |  |  | 05-2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 80-2 | 78-4 | 84-1 | 83-2 |  |  | 88-2 |  | 87-1 | 93-3 | 70-1 | 69-3 | 72-2 | 68-1 | 63-2 |  | 64-4 |  | 04-3 | 05-1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 80-1 | 78-3 | 83-1 | 77-1 | 86-1 | 90-4 | 87-4 | 91-4 | 73-3 | 87-2 | 57-3 | 66-4 | 71-2 | 67-1 | 61-1 | 96-4 | 64-3 |  | 03-3 | 04-4 |  |  | 02-1 |  |  | 00-2 |  |
|  | 79-4 | 78-2 | 77-3 | 76-4 | 76-3 | 89-1 | 86-4 | 91-2 | 70-3 | 73-2 | 57-2 | 62-4 | 66-3 | 63-1 | 60-1 | 68-4 | 64-2 |  | 03-2 | 04-2 |  | 02-2 | 01-2 |  |  | 99-4 |  |
| 82-3 | 79-3 | 78-1 | 77-2 | 75-4 | 76-2 | 88-4 | 86-3 | 89-4 | 70-2 | 70-4 | 56-4 | 62-3 | 60-4 | 62-2 | 59-3 | 65-3 | 64-1 | 03-1 | 02-4 | 04-1 |  | 01-4 | 01-1 |  |  | 99-3 |  |
| 82-2 | 79-2 | 77-4 | 75-1 | 75-3 | 76-1 | 88-3 | 86-2 | 89-3 | 58-1 | 58-2 | 56-2 | 58-3 | 60-3 | 59-4 | 59-2 | 63-4 | 62-1 | 97-1 | 02-3 | 03-4 |  | 01-3 | 98-4 |  |  | 99-2 | 00-3 |
| 82-1 | 79-1 | 74-4 | 74-3 | 75-2 | 74-2 | 88-1 | 74-1 | 73-4 | 57-4 | 57-1 | 56-1 | 56-3 | 60-2 | 58-4 | 59-1 | 61-2 | 61-3 | 61-4 | 97-2 | 97-4 | 97-3 | 98-1 | 98-3 | 98-2 | 00-4 | 99-1 | 00-1 |
| . 35 | . 40 | . 45 | . 50 | . 55 | . 60 | . 65 | . 70 | . 75 | . 80 | . 85 | . 90 | . 95 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.15 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.30 | 1.40 | 1.50 | 1.60 | 1.70 | 1.80 | 1.90 | 2.00 | 2.25 |

Thelast histogram is perhaps the broadest measure of value, the total market capitalization of U.S. stocks divided by GDP. Again, we see the barbell shape and the same dates on the left and theright as wedidin theother histograms. The136.3\%March 31 reading is in thetenth decile. Thishistogram is undoubtedly skewed due to the fact that a higher percentage of companies are public today than historically. Still, the conclusion is the same; stocks remain fairly expensive based on long-term historical valuation measures.


What does this mean for clients of Fiduciary M anagement? Whileit is truethat stocks arenot cheap, the histograms also show that stocks can remain "expensive" for decades. For most of the 26-year history of FMI wehave operated in expensive markets and have been abletofind qual ity franchises at reasonable, if not cheap prices. That remains the casetoday, although it is certainly moredifficult than it was five years ago. Massive amounts of capital have poured into the financial markets over thepast decade. Wearewell aware of this and havepositioned the portfolios accordingly. Currently, the portfol ios have approximately 50\% more exposure to defensive companies than the benchmark. The research team has a list of potential candidates for the portfolio when the price is right.

Barron's recently cited somenumbers showing that three industries - energy, financials, and basic materials - accounted for 44\% of the projected earnings for the S\&P 500 and $56 \%$ of the earnings growth. This is nowhere near as narrow as the late 1990s technology-driven market, but it is considerably more than the 2003-2004 market. Historically, narrow markets have not been a sign of health. We've always viewed uncertain times with an optimistic nature. These periods are particularly fertile for finding new ideas. In short, wearecomfortable operating under a yellow flag.

Thank you for your support of Fiduciary Management, Inc.

## Fiduciary Management Inc. Large Cap Equity Composite 12/31/2000-09/30/2011

| Year | Total Return Gross of Fees \% | Total Return <br> Net of Fees \% | *Benchmark <br> Return \% | Number of Portfolios | Dispersion \% | Total <br> Composite Assets <br> End of Period (\$ millions) |  | Total Firm Assets End of Period (\$ millions) | Percentage of Firm Assets \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2001 | 20.47 | 19.70 | -11.89 | 1 | 0.00 | \$ | 3.6 | \$ 1,458.2 | 0.25\% |
| 2002 | -13.33 | -14.11 | -22.10 | 8 | 0.17 | \$ | 14.0 | \$ 1,731.0 | 0.81\% |
| 2003 | 34.29 | 33.15 | 28.68 | 4 | 0.86 | \$ | 20.8 | \$ 2,927.0 | 0.71\% |
| 2004 | 19.32 | 18.46 | 10.88 | 10 | 0.46 | \$ | 48.9 | \$ 3,085.8 | 1.58\% |
| 2005 | 10.22 | 9.57 | 4.91 | 28 | 0.29 | \$ | 192.2 | \$ 3,174.4 | 6.05\% |
| 2006 | 17.91 | 17.15 | 15.79 | 49 | 0.30 | \$ | 491.0 | \$ 3,589.4 | 13.68\% |
| 2007 | 5.05 | 4.34 | 5.49 | 86 | 0.48 | \$ | 1,000.2 | \$ 3,960.4 | 25.26\% |
| 2008 | -26.38 | -26.91 | -37.00 | 130 | 0.63 | \$ | 1,969.3 | \$ 4,062.5 | 48.48\% |
| 2009 | 30.92 | 30.09 | 26.46 | 252 | 1.22 | \$ | 3,820.3 | \$ 7,008.9 | 54.51\% |
| 2010 | 12.52 | 11.81 | 15.06 | 394 | 0.31 | \$ | 5,923.2 | \$ 9,816.0 | 60.34\% |
| Q1 2011 | 5.01 | 4.85 | 5.92 | 436 | 0.12 | \$ | 6,717.9 | \$ 11,338.0 | 59.25\% |
| Q2 2011 | 2.07 | 1.91 | 0.10 | 459 | 0.11 | \$ | 7,701.2 | \$ 11,819.6 | 65.16\% |
| Q3 2011 | -13.91 | -14.04 | -13.87 | 485 | 0.18 | \$ | 6,989.5 | \$ 10,357.9 | 67.48\% |

*Benchmark: S\&P 500 Index®
Effective January 2012, 2004 - 2011 gross and net composite returns were restated due to an error Returns reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings.
The above table reflects past performance. Past performance does not guarantee future results. A client's investment return may be lower or higher than the performance shown above. Clients may suffer an investment loss.

Fiduciary Management, Inc. (FMI) claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. FMI has been independently verified for the periods 12/31/1993-09/30/2011. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Large Cap Equity composite has been examined for the periods 12/31/2000-09/30/2011. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

FMI was founded in 1980 and is an independent investment counseling firm registered with the SEC and the State of Wisconsin. The firm manages over $\$ 10.3$ billion in assets of pension and profit sharing trusts, mutual funds, Taft-Hartley funds, insurance company portfolios, endowments and personal trusts. The firm includes both institutional and mutual fund business. Although the firm has participated in wrap programs, it is a separate and distinct business, and is excluded from firm-wide assets.

The FMI Large Cap Equity Composite was created in December 2000. These accounts primarily invest in medium to large capitalization US equities.

The FMI Large Cap Equity Composite reflects time-weighted and asset-weighted returns for all discretionary accounts. From December 31, 2000 thru September 30, 2002 all accounts included were managed for at least one quarter, from October 1, 2002 to present all accounts were managed for at least one month. All returns are calculated using United States Dollars and are based on monthly valuations using trade date accounting. All accounts in this composite are fee paying. Gross of fees returns are calculated gross of management fees, gross of custodial fees, gross of withholding taxes and net of transaction costs. Net of fees returns are calculated net of actual management fees and transaction costs and gross of custodial fees and withholding taxes.
Dispersion is calculated using the standard deviation of all accounts in the composite for the entire period.
Currently, the advisory fee structure for the FMI Large Cap Equity Composite portfolios is as follows:

| Up to $\$ 25,000,000$ | $0.65 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\$ 25,000,001-\$ 50,000,000$ | $0.55 \%$ |
| $\$ 50,000,001-\$ 100,000,000$ | $0.45 \%$ |
| $\$ 100,000,001$ and above | $0.40 \%$ |

The firm generally requires a minimum of $\$ 3$ million in assets to establish a discretionary account. High Net Worth individuals may establish an account with a minimum of $\$ 1,000,000$, however, the firm reserves the right to charge a minimum dollar fee for High Net Worth individuals depending on the client servicing involved. The minimum account sizes do not apply to new accounts for which there is a corporate, family, or other substantial relationship to existing accounts. In addition, the firm reserves the right to waive the minimum account size and minimum annual fee under certain circumstances. A complete list and description of all firm composites is available upon request.
Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.
The S\&P 500 Index® is widely regarded as the best single gauge of the U.S. equities market. This index includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy. Although the S\&P 500® focuses on the large cap segment of the market, with approximately $75 \%$ coverage of U.S. equities, it is also an ideal proxy for the total market.
The Large Cap Equity composite uses the S\&P 500 Index® as its primary index comparison.

