

## Exhibit D

# Statement on Proxy Voting Policies and Voting Procedures

(Updated 8/2023)

#### 1 Policies

Fiduciary Management, Inc. ("FMI") will vote proxies in a manner that we feel best protects the interests of the common shareholder. We will look critically upon any issue or vote that will limit or reduce the prerogatives and/or influence of the common shareholders. To assist in our review of the proxies we receive, we may refer to the analyses and voting recommendations of an independent, third-party proxy service provider (e.g. Glass, Lewis, & Co, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., etc. (each, a "Proxy Service Provider")). While we may consider the analyses and recommendations provided by a Proxy Service Provider in making a final voting decision, we do not consider recommendations from a Proxy Service Provider to be determinative of our ultimate decision. Rather, we exercise our independent judgment in making voting decisions (except as discussed below).

The following statement of policies is couched in terms of our general posture on various issues, recognizing that there are always exceptions.

### 2 Administrative Issues

We will generally vote in favor of the re-election of directors and the appointment of actuaries, auditors, and similar professionals. We will also vote in favor of programs of indemnification of directors, which are consistent with common practice. The changing of auditors raises a yellow flag, and we try to determine the reasons for any change. If the change results from a dispute between the company and the auditors, and we feel the auditor's position is correct, we will vote against making a change.

## 3 Management Entrenchment Issues

We will generally vote against any proposal or policy that seeks to prevent the takeover of a company that is in receipt of a bona fide offer, whether friendly or otherwise. Such anti-takeover policies may include, but are not limited to, poison pill, super-majority voting, golden parachute arrangements, and staggered board arrangements, where that represents a change from a standard board. We will generally vote in favor of maintaining preemptive rights for shareholders, one share/one vote, and cumulative voting rights. Generally, we will support proposals calling for majority vote for directors and separation of the Chairman and CEO roles.

We will tend to vote against creation of classes of stock with superior voting rights, which protect management's voting control despite reduced financial commitment of management to the company. We will evaluate proposals, such as changing state of incorporation, fiscal year, or corporate charter, in



light of specific circumstances prompting the proposal, to determine whether the proposed change would reduce shareholders' rights.

## 4 Mergers and Acquisitions

Voting on mergers, acquisitions, or spin-offs requires an evaluation of the impact of those transactions upon the company, and we will vote based upon our assessment of what is best for the company and therefore the shareholders. With respect to a proposed takeover of the company, we initially evaluate an offer for the company in terms of the fairness of the price. We do this in the context of a two- to three-year time horizon to avoid selling at a premium over a temporarily depressed stock price. We would generally vote in favor of offers that represent a fair price, paid either in cash or in exchange for liquid securities of strong acquiring firms. We will oppose offers which we feel represent an unfair price, and we will oppose offers where shareholders are asked to finance a takeover by taking back debt or preferred stock of questionable quality. We tend to be skeptical of management-led leveraged buyouts, as we feel it is very difficult for them to be objective as to the value of the company when they are the purchaser.

## 5 Management Incentives

We strongly favor programs that encourage outright stock ownership as opposed to conventional option plans. In limited cases, when the options are earmarked for lower-level employees and the absolute amount is modest, we will vote affirmatively. We generally vote against traditional stock option plans. Typical option plans result in a misalignment of management and shareholder interests, due to the asymmetrical risk profile of an option. Since there is no downside risk, management has an incentive to take excessive risk. In short, executives tend to cease thinking like true owners. We like to see senior and executive level managers own stock in multiples of their annual salary.

Ideally, we prefer to see bonuses and incentive awards paid in stock (with a vesting period), rather than cash or options. We look for stock award plans to be based on tangible operating performance metrics, such as return-on-invested capital or profit margin.

Additionally, when we deem management as excessively compensated, we will likely vote against any kind of additional reward plan, even if the plan by itself looks reasonable.

#### 6 Social Issues

Our general posture with respect to social issues is to support management so long as they are complying with the spirit of the laws and regulations of the United States of America. Shareholder proposals must be considered on a case-by-case basis with our main goal of maximizing our investment returns. The number of specific issues that we have seen raised on proxy votes with respect to social and labor issues are increasing. Since there is much "gray" and little "black and white" with respect to the level of corporate commitment to many of the social issues, and since we are generally supportive of the goals and policies of the companies which we own, we tend to vote in favor of management on



these issues absent evidence that the company is abusing our trust or damaging shareholder returns. If it is the desire of a client to provide input and direction on the voting of proxies with respect to certain issues, we would be more than happy to advise them when such issues arise and to defer to their wishes in voting on those issues.

#### 7 Conflicts of Interest

FMI strives to ensure that all conflicts of interest are resolved in the best interests of its clients. When there is an apparent conflict of interest, or the appearance of a conflict of interest (e.g., where FMI may receive fees from a company for advisory or other services at the same time that FMI has investments in the stock of that company), we will vote with management on those issues on which brokerage firms are allowed to vote without customer approval under NYSE rules (e.g., directors and auditors). In all other cases involving a conflict or appearance of a conflict, we will cause the proxies to be voted in accordance with the recommendations of a Proxy Service Provider.

### 8 Procedures

FMI has the responsibility and authority to vote proxies with respect to the securities under its management unless the right to vote proxies is expressly reserved for the client, plan trustees or other plan fiduciary. FMI will advise the pension committee, board of trustees, custodian or client to forward all proxy materials to its offices and will take reasonable steps to ensure that they are received. We will review the issues to be voted upon and vote the proxies in accordance with the policies stated above, unless directed otherwise by the client. We will maintain and monitor all meeting, ballot, account and vote information, and make this information available to clients upon request.

In situations where securities held in a portfolio are not generally owned "across the board" in all client accounts with the same investment style (i.e., small holdings), we will vote those proxies based upon the management's recommendations.

Proxies cannot be voted on any securities that have been loaned out by the client. Where securities have been loaned out and a vote is required regarding a material event, FMI will attempt to recall the loaned security in order to vote the proxy. This does not apply to "small holdings" as defined above. Please note that in certain circumstances, securities on loan may not be recalled due to circumstances beyond the control of FMI.