QUARTERLY REPORT
June 30, 2020

FMI Large Cap Fund
Investor Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIHX)
Institutional Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIQX)

FMI International Fund
Investor Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIJX)
Institutional Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIYX)

FMI Common Stock Fund
Investor Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIMX)
Institutional Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIUX)

FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged
Investor Class (Not Available For Sale)
Institutional Class (Ticker Symbol: FMIFX)

FMI Funds, Inc.

Advised by Fiduciary Management, Inc.
www.fmifunds.com

Beginning on January 1, 2021, as permitted by regulations adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, paper copies of the Funds' annual and semi-annual shareholder reports will no longer be sent by mail, unless you specifically request paper copies of the reports from the Funds or from your financial intermediary (such as a broker-dealer or a bank). Instead, the reports will be made available on the Funds' website www.fmifunds.com, and you will be notified by mail each time a report is posted and provided with a website link to access the report.

If you already elected to receive shareholder reports electronically, you will not be affected by this change and you need not take any action. You may elect to receive shareholder reports and other communications from the Funds electronically anytime by contacting your financial intermediary (such as a broker-dealer or a bank) or, if you are a direct investor, by calling 1-800-811-5311.

You may elect to receive all future reports in paper free of charge. If you invest through a financial intermediary, you can contact your financial intermediary to request that you continue to receive paper copies of your shareholder reports. If you invest directly with the Funds, you can call 1-800-811-5311 to let the Funds know you wish to continue receiving paper copies of your shareholder reports. Your election to receive reports in paper will apply to all Funds held in your account if you invest through your financial intermediary or all Funds held with the fund complex if you invest directly with the Funds.

FMI Funds, Inc.

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FMI Large Cap Fund

June 30, 2020

Dear Fellow Shareholders:

The FMI Large Cap Fund ("Fund") returned 15.47%[1] in the June quarter compared to 20.54% for the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) and 14.29% for the Russell 1000 Value Index (Russell 1000 Value). Health Services, Health Technology, and Producer Manufacturing added to performance compared to the S&P 500 in the period. Finance, Electronic Technology, and Technology Services detracted relative to the S&P 500. Masco Corp., Quest Diagnostics, and Schlumberger aided the results, while Berkshire Hathaway, Charles Schwab, and Omnicom lagged.

If there was a mercy rule in the game of growth versus value investing this year, the contest would have been called and the kids pulled off the field. Year-to-date, the Russell 1000 Growth Index has outperformed the Russell 1000 Value Index by an astonishing 26.07% (nearly identical to the 25.81% spread of growth over value in 1999). The preeminence of the FAAANM (Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet "Google," Apple, Netflix, and Microsoft), and to a somewhat lesser degree, a couple of dozen or so other names like them, is remarkable. Following are charts showing the performance of the S&P 500 with and without FAAANM, and the percentage of the S&P 500 (22.43%) these names currently represent. While these stocks get a lot of attention and are certainly highly valued, many of the most egregiously overvalued issues are not FAAANM, but rather can be found in SaaS (software-as-a-service), health and biotechnology, and financial technology. For example, Shopify has a market valuation of $113 billion, compared to sales of just $1.7 billion (last twelve months) and negative $132 million in net income. As *Barron's* recently reported, Shopify's market value is approximately six times the projected 2027 size of the entire ecommerce software market.[2] This article also revealed that ten tech stocks greater than $5 billion in market value gained over 130% year-to-date.



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1 The FMI Large Cap Fund Investor Class (FMIHX) and the FMI Large Cap Fund Institutional Class (FMIQX) had a return of 15.47% and 15.49%, respectively, for the second quarter of 2020.

2 *Barron's* 7/2/20 cites Grand View Research projecting 2027 ecommerce software industry size of $20.6 billion.

Today we have two stock markets. The first market is the popular one, driven by technology, biotechnology, other "growth stocks" (often better-performing if they are money-losers) momentum plays, and coronavirus beneficiaries. This market is abetted by a belief in perpetually-low interest rates ("the Fed has your back"), and a mantra that no amount of fiscal stimulus could possibly be deleterious. The popular market is impervious to disease, social unrest/mayhem, unemployment, socialism, debt, poor GDP growth, trade tensions, and poisonous politics. The second market, the unpopular one, has at its core a lower form of life, a species called "value stocks." In that market, a shrinking band of unenlightened Luddites ply a trade practiced successfully for ages, but one that today is viewed with various degrees of disdain. This market is fearful of record-high valuations, rampant speculation, weak earnings, dangerous balance sheets, rate normalization, difficult economies, and what happens when any person, corporation, or government spends beyond its means. The difference between these two markets is cavernous.



The S&P 500 has morphed from a broadly diversified core index a decade ago, to one dominated by a handful of companies; it looks and behaves like a growth stock benchmark. The FMI Large Cap Fund has always focused on relatively low-valuation, high-quality companies, and has generally sold at a meaningful discount to the S&P 500, and a more modest discount to the Russell 1000 Value. Today, the average discount (on the metrics below) to the S&P 500 is exceptionally wide (~41%) and is also substantial relative to the Russell 1000 Value (~19%).

June 30, 2020 Weighted Average Valuations*	FMI Large Cap Fund	iShares S&P 500	Discount to the Benchmark
P/E (1 Year Trailing)	21.9x	35.3x	38%
FY1 P/E (1 Year Forward)	26.0x	33.7x	23%
P/S	1.9x	5.4x	65%
EV/EBITDA	12.8x	21.0x	39%
Average Valuation Discount			41%

** Estimated valuations for FMI and the iShares are weighted average valuation calculations, not reweighted to exclude cash, and financial companies are excluded from the EV/EBITDA calculation. Valuations for both the portfolio and the ETF are modified based on criteria identified by FMI. For more detailed information regarding these valuations, please contact FMI.*

June 30, 2020 Weighted Average Valuations*	FMI Large Cap Fund	iShares Russell 1000 Value	Discount to the Benchmark
P/E (1 Year Trailing)	21.9x	26.9x	19%
FY1 P/E (1 Year Forward)	26.0x	26.9x	3%
P/S	1.9x	3.3x	42%
EV/EBITDA	12.8x	14.6x	12%
Average Valuation Discount			19%

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In recent years, the Fund has consistently outperformed the value index, but has not kept pace with the S&P 500, which benefits not only from the dominant growth stocks previously mentioned, but also the flow of dollars to passive strategies, which we believe will exhaust itself when growth stocks sputter, momentum reverses, rates change, or externalities hit.

Sometimes a picture can truly capture the essence of reality. Below is a price chart and total return table for Berkshire Hathaway compared to the S&P 500 over the past decade. The S&P 500 has beaten this premier value stock by approximately 146 percent cumulatively. Berkshire's great track record, stable of solid businesses, Fort Knox balance sheet (~$400 billion of very liquid equity value), and cheap valuation apparently mean little today.

Comparable Returns	Price Change (%)		Total Return (%)	
	Cum.	Ann (CGR)	Cum.	Ann (CGR)
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B	124.01	8.39	124.01	8.39
S&P 500	200.79	11.63	270.31	13.98

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B Relative to Comparables	Price Change (%)		Total Return (%)	
	Cum.	Ann (CGR)	Cum.	Ann (CGR)
S&P 500	-76.79	-3.24	-146.30	-5.58

Conversely, more investors seem to want stocks like Tesla, which has a market capitalization of $200 billion, has not turned a profit since its founding 17 years ago, consumes prodigious amounts of cash, and competes in a highly competitive car industry, where virtually every automaker and emerging competitor is targeting electric vehicles. Approximately a year ago, Tesla traded for $223 per share, up sevenfold from seven years earlier. As of 6/30/20, it was $1,080. Debt has gone from virtually zero to $14.5 billion over the past ten years. The contrast between Tesla and Berkshire Hathaway is stark. At FMI, we use the mental imagery of a five-year lockbox when evaluating competing ideas. "Which stock would you rather own if you had to lock them both up for five years?"[3] Given today's enormous macro concerns and sky-high valuations for growth stocks, and what could happen if fear struck, it appears to be a proverbial layup to us. Yet our perception is that the large majority of investors today would pick Tesla (or Shopify, Zoom, Datadog, etc.).

30 Nov 2019 | Source: Kenneth French, Centre for Research in Security Prices, Orbis. Relative return series calculated from the monthly return of US high book-to-price portfolio less the return of US low-book-to-price portfolio, large- and small-cap shares, rebased to 1 at July 1926.

We offer explanations but no excuses for underperforming an index that is being driven by stocks we consider to be overvalued. Hindsight will always show that we missed some great growth stocks. It isn't our style or philosophy to chase "winners" in the hope they will keep winning. We buy only when fundamentals and valuation justify it. Amazon, for example, has been a great growth company, but we cannot step up today to a stock trading at over 200 times free cash flow (FCF) when adjusting for finance leases and stock-based compensation, with the implied expectation that FCF will grow in excess of 30% compounded for ten years.[3] Our experience is that a portfolio of relatively out-of-favor stocks that have solid underlying fundamentals tends to outperform the collective group of growth stocks over time. The chart above shows the near 100-year superior record of value investing, with the more recent difficult period boxed.

Despite the tough run for value, we are optimistic the tide will turn. Investors today cannot envision FAAANM or similar stocks underperforming, but the history of markets is that vaunted names lose their luster, and herd behavior is not perpetually rewarded. We haven't seen a more universally-held opinion than the one recently reiterated by a hedge fund analyst, as relayed to us by a Wall Street contact: "Selling is for fools. Just buy V (Visa), MA (Mastercard), PYPL (PayPal), FAANG, and all things SaaS (software as a service), and just come back in 5 years to count your money." It's nearly identical to the commentary we heard in 1999 about the great growth stocks of that era. As the old saw goes, *markets make opinions; opinions don't make markets*. People will always craft a message to justify the prevailing investment sentiment. Speculation in money-losing stocks is as widespread as we have ever seen. In June,

[3] 10-Year expected growth rate equals 37% with a 3% terminal growth rate and an 8% cost of equity.

The Wall Street Journal quoted Dave Portnoy, founder of Barstool Sports (and ersatz day trading guru), who told his listeners, “Stocks only go up, this is the easiest game I’ve been part of!” And, “It took me a while to figure out that the stock market isn’t connected to the economy.”

Servpro is a company who cleans up homes and buildings after fires and floods. Its clever advertising jingle is “Like it Never Even Happened!” For growth stocks, it truly is like it never happened. The “it” being 2020’s unprecedented economic collapse, severe unemployment, rapid increase in debt, and large corporate earnings decline. Yet despite all of this, the year-to-date gains in the NYSE FANG Plus Index, NASDAQ Composite Index, and Russell 1000 Growth Index are 32.33%, 12.74% and 9.81%, respectively. Contrast that with the S&P 500 Energy Sector Index, which is down 35.34%; the S&P 500 Financial Sector Index, down 23.65%; the S&P 500 Industrials Sector Index, down 14.64%; and the Russell 1000 Value, down 16.26%. All of these indices are connected to the same economy, which today is operating close to 40% below (quarter-over-quarter) where it was just a few months ago, according to the Atlanta Federal Reserve. Unemployment is certainly on the mend, but over 19 million people remain out of work, and there is a growing concern that a significant number will not regain employment anytime soon. The action in the stock market suggests a so-called “V-shaped” recovery. It may take a lot longer than most investors expect.

If the recovery takes longer than most believe, how does value win?

Value investing can reestablish itself in a myriad of ways. If it goes like the last big tech bubble, which peaked in March of 2000, there might not be any readily identifiable catalyst. Growth stocks just got too expensive. Speculation simply ran too hot. Expectations were far too high. When the momentum shifted in 2000, it became a torrent of selling in the popular names. Value strategies were outstanding for a long time after that. Value could win if the cost of capital rises. Although the Fed is pulling out all the stops to suppress interest rates by printing money and monetizing government debt (and even buying corporate debt), that is not a strategy with limitless potential. The amount of money recently conjured with a keystroke ($3 trillion since February, and an expectation that Fed assets will grow to $10 trillion by this fall) is astonishing, and may find its way to inflation after we get through the economic downdraft. Money supply growth has broken modern peacetime records, according to Tim Congdon, chairman of the Institute of International Monetary Research. Inflation will likely beget higher interest rates and an elevated cost of capital. A higher cost of capital can also come from credit concerns (wider spreads) and greater stock market volatility (increased cost of equity). You don’t need an inflationary environment to see that; we saw it briefly in February and March before the Fed restarted the printing presses. Investors could also have a thing or two to say about sovereign interest rates as they get wise to the dangerous game the Fed is playing. Who wants to loan a government 10-year money at less than 1% when underlying true inflation is much higher than that?

Value could also win if the economy turns around and grows more rapidly than expected. Cyclical and other depressed companies could shine in that scenario. All the extra reserves in the banking system could crank up the loan market, and this might have an impact on inflation and rates. Most growth stocks depend on ultra-low discount rates over a long time horizon. A small change in the discount rate can result in a huge change in the present value of cash flows. Value can also win simply because of size. The popular benchmarks are dominated by bigger companies, most of which are considered growth stocks; the amount of growth needed to move the needle has become high, and the law of large numbers can make it difficult to meet expectations. The notion that nothing bad can happen to the mega-cap tech companies and their suppliers may be fanciful, especially if the political winds blow differently. Anti-trust and other regulatory actions can put a damper on growth and sentiment.



Value could win if investors refocus on balance sheets and self-funding operations. Many of the best performers in today's environment are dependent on capital markets that can shut down when heavy turbulence hits. A market that turns sour tends to refocus investors' minds on sustainable franchises instead of aggressive possibilities. Value could also win as asset allocators start focusing on risk mitigation and good values. Momentum is driving this market, not fundamentals (see chart above). Many investors who are beating the S&P 500 or other growth indices are doing it by owning a higher weighting in the most popular stocks. You can think of it like front-running the flow into passive investment. This will look very different when momentum flips!

These are challenging times to be value oriented. In an effort to keep pace with the indices, we are seeing more and more of our value competitors buying growth stocks. This is exactly what happened in 1999. We will remain steadfast to our disciplines. Stocks can stay disconnected from the fundamentals for only so long. Our team is strong and clear-eyed. We are grateful for the investors who stick with us. We are right there with you. The team continues to increase their ownership of the Fund.

Thank you for your support of the FMI Large Cap Fund.

STATEMENT OF NET ASSETS

June 30, 2020 (Unaudited)

Shares		Value (b)
COMMON STOCKS — 97.1% (a)		
COMMERCIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 2.6%		
	Advertising/Marketing Services — 2.6%	
1,620,000	Omnicom Group Inc.	$ 88,452,000
CONSUMER DURABLES SECTOR — 3.5%		
	Electronics/Appliances — 3.5%	
1,725,000	Sony Corp. — SP-ADR*	119,249,250
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES SECTOR — 9.7%		
	Beverages: Non-Alcoholic — 2.9%	
730,000	PepsiCo Inc.	96,549,800
	Food: Major Diversified — 2.8%	
865,000	Nestlé S.A. — SP-ADR	95,530,600
	Household/Personal Care — 4.0%	
2,470,000	Unilever PLC — SP-ADR	135,553,600
CONSUMER SERVICES SECTOR — 7.3%		
	Cable/Satellite TV — 3.5%	
3,050,000	Comcast Corp. — Cl A	118,889,000
	Other Consumer Services — 3.8%	
80,000	Booking Holdings Inc.*	127,387,200
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES SECTOR — 2.3%		
	Wholesale Distributors — 2.3%	
2,255,000	HD Supply Holdings Inc.*	78,135,750
FINANCE SECTOR — 20.7%		
	Investment Banks/Brokers — 2.8%	
2,750,000	The Charles Schwab Corp.	92,785,000
	Major Banks — 3.0%	
1,055,000	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	99,233,300
	Multi-Line Insurance — 6.0%	
1,130,000	Berkshire Hathaway Inc. — Cl B*	201,716,300
	Property/Casualty Insurance — 6.1%	
995,000	Chubb Ltd.	125,986,900
975,000	Progressive Corp.	78,107,250
		204,094,150
	Regional Banks — 2.8%	
1,185,000	Northern Trust Corp.	94,017,900
HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR — 8.8%		
	Health Industry Services — 5.0%	
1,465,000	Quest Diagnostics Inc.	166,951,400
	Managed Health Care — 3.8%	
435,000	UnitedHealth Group Inc.	128,303,250

Shares		Value (b)
COMMON STOCKS — 97.1% (a) (Continued)		
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 6.0%		
	Medical Specialties — 6.0%	
2,450,000	Koninklijke Philips N.V. — SP-ADR*	$ 114,758,000
2,245,000	Smith & Nephew PLC — SP-ADR	85,579,400
		200,337,400
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 1.5%		
	Oilfield Services/Equipment — 1.5%	
2,710,000	Schlumberger Ltd.	49,836,900
PROCESS INDUSTRIES SECTOR — 2.6%		
	Industrial Specialties — 2.6%	
835,000	PPG Industries Inc.	88,560,100
PRODUCER MANUFACTURING SECTOR — 15.2%		
	Building Products — 5.2%	
3,475,000	Masco Corp.	174,479,750
	Electrical Products — 4.2%	
1,135,000	Eaton Corp. PLC	99,289,800
675,000	Emerson Electric Co.	41,870,250
		141,160,050
	Industrial Conglomerates — 3.0%	
705,000	Honeywell International Inc.	101,935,950
	Trucks/Construction/Farm Machinery — 2.8%	
1,275,000	PACCAR Inc.	95,433,750
RETAIL TRADE SECTOR — 11.7%		
	Apparel/Footwear Retail — 3.0%	
1,995,000	The TJX Companies Inc.	100,867,200
	Discount Stores — 8.7%	
885,000	Dollar General Corp.	168,601,350
1,325,000	Dollar Tree Inc.*	122,801,000
		291,402,350
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SECTOR — 2.8%		
	Information Technology Services — 2.8%	
440,000	Accenture PLC	94,476,800
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR — 2.4%		
	Air Freight/Couriers — 2.4%	
1,080,000	Expeditors International of Washington Inc.	82,123,200
	Total common stocks	3,267,461,950

Principal Amount		Value (b)
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS — 2.7% (a)		
	Bank Deposit Account — 2.7%	
$ 93,275,767	U.S. Bank N.A., 0.09%^	$ 93,275,767
	Total short-term investments	93,275,767
	Total investments — 99.8%	3,360,737,717
	Other assets, less liabilities — **0.2% (a)**	5,888,674
	TOTAL NET ASSETS — 100.0%	$3,366,626,391
	Investor Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($1,511,047,164 ÷ 86,495,226 shares outstanding)	$ 17.47
	Institutional Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($1,855,579,227 ÷ 106,323,707 shares outstanding)	$ 17.45

* Non-income producing security.
^ The rate shown is as of June 30, 2020.
(a) Percentages for the various classifications relate to total net assets.
(b) Each security is valued at the current day last sale price reported by the principal security exchange on which the issue is traded. Securities that are traded on Nasdaq Markets are valued at the Nasdaq Official Closing Price, or if no sale is reported, the latest bid price. Securities that are traded over-the-counter, including U.S. Treasury securities are valued at the close price, if not close, then at the latest bid price. Bank deposits are valued at acquisition cost which approximates fair value.
PLC Public Limited Company
SP-ADR Sponsored American Depositary Receipt

FMI Common Stock Fund

June 30, 2020

Dear Fellow Shareholders:

The FMI Common Stock Fund ("Fund") returned 14.42%[1] in the June quarter compared to 25.42% for the Russell 2000 Index (Russell 2000), and 18.91% for the Russell 2000 Value Index (Russell 2000 Value). Year-to-date, the Fund is behind the Russell 2000 by about 3.7%, and is ahead of the Russell 2000 Value by about 6.9%. Utilities, Transportation, and Communications (all due to a lack of exposure to these sectors) added to performance compared to the Russell 2000 in the period. Producer Manufacturing, Health Technology, Electronic Technology, and Consumer Services detracted relative to the Russell 2000. Robert Half, Ryder System, and Zions Bancorporation aided results, while Carlisle Cos., TriMas Corp., and Graham Holdings lagged.

If there was a mercy rule in the game of growth versus value investing this year, the contest would have been called and the kids pulled off the field. Year-to-date, the Russell 2000 Growth Index has outperformed the Russell 2000 Value by an amazing 20.44%. While the smaller cap indices aren't directly impacted by the FAAANM (Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet "Google," Apple, Netflix, and Microsoft) love affair, in some regards, the speculative fever is even greater than in the large cap arena. Immunomedics Inc., Chegg Inc., and Quidel Corporation were three of the top drivers of the Russell 2000 in the quarter. Immunomedics went from a $2.9 billion market value at the beginning of the quarter to $8.2 billion at the end of the period. It loses money. Chegg went from $4.4 billion to $8.3 billion as of June 30. It also loses money. Quidel went from $4.1 billion to $9.4 billion over the same time frame. It trades at almost 100 times adjusted earnings.

Today we have two stock markets. The first market is the popular one, driven by technology, biotechnology, other "growth stocks" (often better-performing if they are money-losers), momentum plays, and coronavirus beneficiaries. This market is abetted by a belief in perpetually-low interest rates ("the Fed has your back"), and a mantra that no amount of fiscal stimulus could possibly be deleterious. The popular market is impervious to disease, social unrest/mayhem, unemployment, socialism, debt, poor GDP growth, trade tensions, and poisonous politics. The second market, the unpopular one, has at its core a lower form of life, a species called "value stocks." In that market, a shrinking band of unenlightened Luddites ply a trade practiced successfully for ages, but one that today is viewed with various degrees of disdain. This market is fearful of record-high valuations, rampant speculation, weak earnings, dangerous balance sheets, rate normalization, difficult economies, and what happens when any person, corporation, or government spends beyond its means. The difference between these two markets is cavernous.

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[1] The FMI Common Stock Fund Investor Class (FMIMX) and the FMI Common Stock Fund Institutional Class (FMIUX) had a return of 14.42% and 14.52%, respectively, for the second quarter of 2020.

The Russell 2000 has morphed from a relatively diversified core index a decade ago, to one where over 40% of the constituents lose money. It has 398 health technology companies, 345 of which lose money. Yet, this sector's quarterly return exceeds 30%! This trend is even more pronounced within health technology's biotech industry; the chart to the right illustrates its year-to-date success. The Russell 2000 looks and behaves like a growth stock benchmark.



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June 30, 2020 Weighted Average Valuations*	FMI Common Stock Fund	iShares Russell 2000	Discount to the Benchmark
P/E (1 Year Trailing)	21.3x	34.8x	39%
FY1 P/E (1 Year Forward)	21.9x	34.0x	36%
P/S	1.6x	6.0x	73%
EV/EBITDA	10.2x	21.4x	52%
Average Valuation Discount			50%

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June 30, 2020 Weighted Average Valuations*	FMI Common Stock Fund	iShares Russell 2000 Value	Discount to the Benchmark
P/E (1 Year Trailing)	21.3x	26.7x	20%
FY1 P/E (1 Year Forward)	21.9x	27.9x	22%
P/S	1.6x	2.9x	45%
EV/EBITDA	10.2x	12.5x	18%
Average Valuation Discount			26%

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S&P 500	-76.79	-3.24	-146.30	-5.58

Conversely, more investors seem to want stocks like Tesla, which has a market capitalization of $200 billion, has not turned a profit since its founding 17 years ago, consumes prodigious amounts of cash, and competes in a highly-competitive car industry, where virtually every automaker and emerging competitor is targeting electric vehicles. Approximately a year ago, Tesla traded for $223 per share, up sevenfold from seven years earlier. As of 6/30/20, it was $1,080. Debt has gone from virtually zero to $14.5 billion over the past ten years. The contrast between Tesla and Berkshire Hathaway is stark. At FMI, we use the mental imagery of a five-year lockbox when evaluating competing ideas. "Which stock would you rather own if you had to lock them both up for five years?" Given today's enormous macro concerns and sky-high valuations for growth stocks, and what could happen if fear struck, it appears to be a proverbial layup to us. Yet our perception is that the large majority of investors today would pick Tesla (or Shopify, Zoom, Datadog, etc.).

Hindsight will always show that we missed some great growth stocks. It isn't our style or philosophy to chase "winners" in the hope they will keep winning. We buy only when fundamentals and valuation justify it. Amazon, for example, has been a great growth company, but it is trading at over 200 times free cash flow (FCF) when adjusting for financing leases and stock-based compensation, with the implied expectation that FCF will grow in excess of 30% compounded for ten years.[2] Our experience is that a portfolio of relatively out-of-favor stocks that have solid underlying fundamentals tends to outperform the collective group of growth stocks over time. The chart to the right shows the near 100-year superior record of value investing, with the more recent difficult period boxed.

30 Nov 2019 | Source: Kenneth French, Centre for Research in Security Prices, Orbis. Relative return series calculated from the monthly return of US high book-to-price portfolio less the return of US low-book-to-price portfolio, large- and small-cap shares, rebased to 1 at July 1926.

Despite the tough run for value, we are optimistic the tide will turn. Investors today cannot envision FAAANM or similar stocks underperforming, but the history of markets is that vaunted names and the high valuation stocks lose their luster, and herd behavior is not perpetually rewarded. We haven't seen a more universally-held opinion than the one recently reiterated by a hedge fund analyst, as relayed to us by a Wall Street contact: "Selling is for fools. Just buy V (Visa), MA (Mastercard), PYPL (PayPal), FAANG, and all things SaaS (software as a service), and just come back in 5 years to count your money." It's nearly identical to the commentary we heard in 1999 about the great growth stocks of that era. As the old saw goes, *markets make opinions; opinions don't make markets*. People will always craft a message to justify the prevailing investment sentiment. Speculation in money-losing stocks is as widespread as we have ever seen. In June, *The Wall Street Journal* quoted Dave Portnoy, founder of Barstool Sports (and ersatz day trading guru), who told his listeners, "Stocks only go up, this is the easiest game I've been part of!" And, "It took me a while to figure out that the stock market isn't connected to the economy."

Servpro is a company who cleans up homes and buildings after fires and floods. Its clever advertising jingle is "Like it Never Even Happened!" For growth stocks, it truly is *like it never happened*. The "it" being 2020's unprecedented economic collapse, severe unemployment, rapid increase in debt, and large corporate earnings decline. Yet despite all of this, the year-to-date gains in the NYSE FANG Plus Index, NASDAQ Composite Index, and Russell 2000 Growth Index are 32.33%, 12.74% and -3.06%, respectively. Contrast that with the S&P 500 Energy Sector Index, which is down 35.34%; the S&P 500 Financial Sector Index, down 23.65%; the S&P 500 Industrials Sector Index, down 14.64%; and the Russell 2000 Value, down 23.50%. All of these indices are connected to the same economy, which today is operating close to 40% below (quarter-over-quarter) where it was

2 10-Year expected growth rate equals 37% with a 3% terminal growth rate and an 8% cost of equity.

just a few months ago, according to the Atlanta Federal Reserve. Unemployment is certainly on the mend, but over 19 million people remain out of work, and there is a growing concern that a significant number will not regain employment anytime soon. The action in the stock market suggests a so-called "V-shaped" recovery. It may take a lot longer than most investors expect.

If the recovery takes longer than most believe, how does value win?

Value investing can reestablish itself in a myriad of ways. If it goes like the last big tech bubble, which peaked in March of 2000, there might not be any readily identifiable catalyst. Growth stocks just got too expensive. Speculation simply ran too hot. Expectations were far too high. When the momentum shifted in 2000, it became a torrent of selling in the popular names. Value strategies were outstanding for a long time after that. Value could win if the cost of capital rises. Although the Fed is pulling out all the stops to suppress interest rates by printing money and monetizing government debt (and even buying corporate debt), that is not a strategy with limitless potential. The amount of money recently conjured with a keystroke ($3 trillion since February, and an expectation that Fed assets will grow to $10 trillion by this fall) is astonishing, and may find its way to inflation after we get through the economic downdraft. Money supply growth has broken modern peacetime records, according to Tim Congdon, chairman of the Institute of International Monetary Research. Inflation will likely beget higher interest rates and an elevated cost of capital. A higher cost of capital can also come from credit concerns (wider spreads) and greater stock market volatility (increased cost of equity). You don't need an inflationary environment to see that; we saw it briefly in February and March before the Fed restarted the printing presses. Investors could also have a thing or two to say about sovereign interest rates as they get wise to the dangerous game the Fed is playing. Who wants to loan a government 10-year money at less than 1% when underlying true inflation is much higher than that?

Value could also win if the economy turns around and grows more rapidly than expected. Cyclical and other depressed companies could shine in that scenario. All the extra reserves in the banking system could crank up the loan market, and this might have an impact on inflation and rates. Most growth stocks depend on ultra-low discount rates over a long time horizon. A small change in the discount rate can result in a huge change in the present value of cash flows. Value can also win simply because of size. The popular benchmarks are dominated by bigger companies, most of which are considered growth stocks; the amount of growth needed to move the needle has become high, and the law of large numbers can make it difficult to meet expectations. The notion that nothing bad can happen to the mega-cap tech companies and their suppliers may be fanciful, especially if the political winds blow differently. Anti-trust and other regulatory actions can put a damper on growth and sentiment.

Value could win if investors refocus on balance sheets and self-funding operations. Many of the best performers in today's environment are dependent on capital markets that can shut down when heavy turbulence hits. A market that turns sour tends to refocus investors' minds on sustainable franchises instead of aggressive possibilities. Value could also win as asset allocators start focusing on risk mitigation and good values. Momentum is driving this market, not fundamentals (see chart above). Many investors who are beating the S&P 500 or other growth indices are doing it by owning a higher weighting in the most popular stocks. You can think of it like front running the flow into passive investment. This will look very different when momentum flips!



These are challenging times to be value-oriented. In an effort to keep pace with the indices, we are seeing more and more of our value competitors buying growth stocks. This is exactly what happened in 1999. We will remain steadfast to our disciplines. Stocks can stay disconnected from the fundamentals for only so long. Our team is strong and clear-eyed. We are grateful for the investors who stick with us. We are right there with you. The team continues to increase their ownership of the Fund.

Thank you for your confidence in the FMI Common Stock Fund.

STATEMENT OF NET ASSETS

June 30, 2020 (Unaudited)

Shares		Value (b)
COMMON STOCKS — 92.6% (a)		
COMMERCIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 13.9%		
	Advertising/Marketing Services — 3.3%	
1,420,000	Interpublic Group of Cos. Inc.	$ 24,367,200
	Miscellaneous Commercial Services — 5.2%	
1,070,000	Genpact Ltd.	39,076,400
	Personnel Services — 5.4%	
170,000	ManpowerGroup Inc.	11,687,500
545,000	Robert Half International Inc.	28,792,350
		40,479,850
CONSUMER SERVICES SECTOR — 2.3%		
	Other Consumer Services — 2.3%	
50,000	Graham Holdings Co.	17,133,500
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES SECTOR — 13.2%		
	Electronics Distributors — 3.1%	
340,000	Arrow Electronics Inc.*	23,354,600
	Medical Distributors — 2.2%	
280,000	Henry Schein Inc.*	16,349,200
	Wholesale Distributors — 7.9%	
225,000	Applied Industrial Technologies Inc.	14,037,750
920,000	HD Supply Holdings Inc.*	31,878,000
185,000	MSC Industrial Direct Co. Inc.	13,469,850
		59,385,600
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 2.2%		
	Aerospace & Defense — 1.0%	
43,000	Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc.	7,503,070
	Electronic Components — 1.2%	
125,000	Plexus Corp.*	8,820,000
FINANCE SECTOR — 23.6%		
	Finance/Rental/Leasing — 6.5%	
445,000	FirstCash Inc.	30,028,600
495,000	Ryder System Inc.	18,567,450
		48,596,050
	Investment Banks/Brokers — 2.6%	
350,000	Houlihan Lokey Inc.	19,474,000
	Multi-Line Insurance — 3.7%	
31,000	White Mountains Insurance Group Ltd.	27,527,070
	Property/Casualty Insurance — 2.7%	
345,000	W.R. Berkley Corp.	19,765,050
	Real Estate Development — 4.6%	
275,000	The Howard Hughes Corp.*	14,286,250
1,325,000	Kennedy-Wilson Holdings Inc.	20,166,500
		34,452,750

Shares		Value (b)
COMMON STOCKS — 92.6% (a) (Continued)		
FINANCE SECTOR — 23.6% (Continued)		
	Regional Banks — 3.5%	
775,000	Zions Bancorporation	$ 26,350,000
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 3.7%		
	Medical Specialties — 2.7%	
460,000	Dentsply Sirona Inc.	20,267,600
	Pharmaceuticals: Major — 1.0%	
290,000	Phibro Animal Health Corp.	7,618,300
PROCESS INDUSTRIES SECTOR — 8.3%		
	Containers/Packaging — 6.0%	
395,000	Avery Dennison Corp.	45,065,550
	Industrial Specialties — 2.3%	
375,000	Donaldson Co. Inc.	17,445,000
PRODUCER MANUFACTURING SECTOR — 21.8%		
	Building Products — 4.7%	
415,000	A.O. Smith Corp.	19,554,800
200,000	Armstrong World Industries Inc.	15,592,000
		35,146,800
	Industrial Machinery — 4.9%	
199,000	EnPro Industries Inc.	9,808,710
430,000	Flowserve Corp.	12,263,600
190,000	Woodward Inc.	14,734,500
		36,806,810
	Metal Fabrication — 1.1%	
70,000	Valmont Industries Inc.	7,953,400
	Miscellaneous Manufacturing — 8.3%	
300,000	Carlisle Cos. Inc.	35,901,000
1,090,000	TriMas Corp.*	26,105,500
		62,006,500
	Trucks/Construction/Farm Machinery — 2.8%	
990,000	Trinity Industries Inc.	21,077,100
RETAIL TRADE SECTOR — 2.0%		
	Specialty Stores — 2.0%	
380,000	Penske Automotive Group Inc.	14,709,800
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SECTOR — 1.6%		
	Information Technology Services — 1.6%	
240,000	Insight Enterprises Inc.*	11,808,000
	Total common stocks	692,539,200

Principal Amount		Value (b)
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS — 7.1% (a)		
	Bank Deposit Account — 7.1%	
$53,068,821	U.S. Bank N.A., 0.09%^	$ 53,068,821
	Total short-term investments	53,068,821
	Total investments — 99.7%	745,608,021
	Other assets, less liabilities — **0.3% (a)**	2,067,374
	TOTAL NET ASSETS — 100.0%	$747,675,395
	Investor Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($380,092,414 ÷ 17,354,059 shares outstanding)	$ 21.90
	Institutional Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($367,582,981 ÷ 16,762,222 shares outstanding)	$ 21.93

* Non-income producing security.
^ The rate shown is as of June 30, 2020.
(a) Percentages for the various classifications relate to total net assets.
(b) Each security is valued at the current day last sale price reported by the principal security exchange on which the issue is traded. Securities that are traded on Nasdaq Markets are valued at the Nasdaq Official Closing Price, or if no sale is reported, the latest bid price. Securities that are traded over-the-counter, including U.S. Treasury securities are valued at the close price, if not close, then at the latest bid price. Bank deposits are valued at acquisition cost which approximates fair value.

FMI International Fund
and
FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged

June 30, 2020

Dear Fellow Shareholders:

Despite the global economy heading for the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression (1930s), stock markets emphatically rebounded in the June quarter. Expensive growth stocks led the charge once again, as value stocks continued to languish. Investors appeared willing to look past weak economic and business fundamentals; rapidly-expanding government, corporate and consumer debt; increasing fiscal deficits; depression-like unemployment; and a potential fallout from a second wave of COVID-19. With unprecedented stimulus, governments and central banks have blown open the money-printing floodgates, to the speculators' delight. Momentum-driven equity markets have become unhinged from economic reality, which unfortunately has not played well for conservative, valuation-conscious Funds.

The FMI International Funds ("Funds") appreciated by 14.08%[1] (currency hedged) and 14.28%[2] (currency unhedged) in the second quarter, respectively, which compares with an MSCI EAFE Index gain of 12.60% in local currency (LOC) and 14.88% in U.S. Dollars (USD). The MSCI EAFE Value Index gained 12.43%, losing another 4.52% to the MSCI EAFE Growth Index in the quarter (16.95%), and is now trailing by a remarkable 15.75% year-to-date, and 18.63% over the past 12 months. For the Funds, Distribution Services, Industrial Services, and Electronic Technology sectors were among the strongest performers in the period, while Consumer Services, Producer Manufacturing, and Communications weighed on the results. B&M European Value Retail, Ferguson, and Akzo Nobel outperformed on a relative basis, as Compass Group, Whitbread, and Fairfax Financial Holdings each underperformed, respectively.

We continue to have great confidence in our Funds over the long run. We own a collection of high-quality businesses with sound balance sheets, that trade at a significant discount to their intrinsic values, our benchmarks, and many of our value-oriented peers. Buying above-average businesses at below-average valuations has been a winning combination throughout FMI's 40-year history, and we expect more of the same in the years to come.

<u>A Long, Slow Road Ahead</u>

The near-term economic outlook is uncertain at best, and dire by any normal standards. While we have seen a modest bounce off the bottom in some of the fundamentals, stock markets appear to be pricing in a strong "V-shaped" recovery, of

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1 The FMI International Fund [currency hedged] Investor Class (FMIJX) and the FMI International Fund [currency hedged] Institutional Class (FMIYX) had a return of 14.08% and 14.11%, respectively, for the second quarter of 2020.

2 The FMI International Fund [currency unhedged] Institutional Class (FMIFX) had a return of 14.28% for the second quarter of 2020.

which we are quite skeptical. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecasts a global GDP decline of 6% in 2020, and that's if COVID-19 continues to recede. In an "equally possible" scenario, which includes a second wave of COVID-19, they are forecasting a 7.6% contraction. They expect that the road to recovery "will be slow and the crisis will have long-lasting effects, disproportionally affecting the most vulnerable people."[3] We share these concerns. When the support runs out, growth will be much harder to come by than most people are expecting.

In Europe, for example, the employment situation is far worse than it appears on the surface. While Eurozone unemployment is expected to reach 10% by the end of June, employment subsidy programs have been propping up around *45 million jobs, or one third of the workforce*, in Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain. This allows companies to furlough employees or reduce their hours temporarily, while the state pays a significant portion of their wages. A fifth of those jobs (9 million) may be at risk of permanent loss when the employment protection schemes come to an end in the fall, according to a recent study by Allianz.[4] Unfortunately, low-wage workers without degrees have been the hardest hit by COVID-19, expanding the wealth and income inequality gap.[5] Quantitative easing (QE) and negative interest rate policies have padded the pockets of asset owners (stocks, bonds, real estate, art, etc.), exacerbating the issue. Protests that occurred across the globe included the topic of racial inequities from these imbalances. Social unrest has largely been ignored from a stock market perspective, but can have a real fundamental impact on the economy.



Meanwhile, debt levels are on a sharp upward trajectory, as falling corporate earnings and increasing job losses will weigh heavily on businesses and households, and governments are issuing debt at a record pace. According to the Institute of International Finance in April, "Global debt across all sectors rose by over $10 trillion in 2019, topping $255 trillion. At over 322% of GDP, global debt is now 40 percentage points ($87 trillion) higher than at the onset of the 2008 financial crisis – a sobering realization as governments worldwide gear up to fight the pandemic." They expect debt-to-GDP to reach upwards of 342% by year-end. With over $20 trillion of bonds and loans coming

[3] Laurence Boone, OECD Chief Economist. "OECD Economic Outlook: The World Economy on a Tightrope." Presentation slide deck. June 10, 2020.

[4] Ben Hall, Delphine Strauss, Daniel Dombey. "Millions of jobs at risk when furlough ends." *Financial Times*. June 20, 2020.

[5] Kalyeena Makortoff. "Workers without degrees hardest hit by Covid-19 crisis – study." *The Guardian*. April 20, 2020.

due this year, refinancing could prove difficult.[6] For years, balance sheets have been an afterthought for investors, which is no longer the case today. Rates are exceptionally low, *for now*, helping ease the debt service burden, but that can change in the blink of an eye.

Prevailing Wisdom: Rates Will Stay Low Forever

Markets have rebounded strongly in large part due to unparalleled (eye-popping) stimulus programs. By early May, governments and central banks had unveiled *$15 trillion* of fiscal and monetary stimulus (and counting), equal to an astounding *17% of an $87 trillion global economy* last year. These are "record sums that will swell balance sheets and deficits to peacetime highs," per a *Reuters* report. "Shaken by turmoil in financial markets in March, with their economies heading into freefall and a decade of job creation wiped out, policymakers have seized upon tool after tool to rescue their economies – including taboo policies such as cash handouts and buying 'junk' bonds."[7] As can be seen in the chart below,[8] it's safe to say that the European Union will not be adhering to their 3% deficit ceiling from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty any time soon.



Conjuring up $15 trillion out of thin air in a matter of months could have significant long-term ramifications and unintended consequences. Inflation (and higher rates), which almost no one seems to be expecting, is a risk that is widely underappreciated. The notion that rates will "stay low forever" has essentially become a universal belief, which is dangerous. Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006) described it best: "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output."[9] Sound applicable today? While the near term may prove deflationary, inflation will likely follow. The question is when?

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6 "Global Debt Monitor: COVID-19 Lights a Fuse." *Institute of International Finance*. April 6, 2020.
7 Tommy Wilkes, Ritvik Carvalho. "$15 trillion and counting: global stimulus so far." *Reuters*. May 11, 2020.
8 Michael Hartnett, Shirley Wu. "The Flow Show." *BofA Global Research*. June 18, 2020.
9 https://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/friedman_images/Collections/2016c21/IEA_1970.pdf

There are several paths that could lead to inflation and/or higher rates. For one, let's assume money printing *actually* works (we do not think it will) and we enter a lasting recovery. In such a scenario, there will be a lot more money chasing the same amount of goods, or fewer goods, assuming it takes years to return to 2019 output levels. Alternatively, if money printing fails, then the economy will be weaker for longer. We would not be surprised, as economic growth has been disappointing despite unprecedented levels of accommodation. In this scenario, defaults and bankruptcies are likely to rise dramatically, which will eventually cause the cost of capital to increase as lenders demand appropriate interest rates for the risk they are taking. This could impact governments, corporations, and individuals alike.

Interestingly, low rates have been a big tailwind for growth investments. Compared with value stocks, growth stocks have a greater proportion of their value derived from future earnings (years down the road). The present value of a business is the sum of its future cash flows, discounted back at a specified rate of return (discount rate). The higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of those future cash flows. The lower the discount rate, the higher the present value. With negative rates across Europe and Japan, and rates near zero in the U.S., ultra-low discount rates have been used to justify growth stocks' sky-high valuations. In 5,000 years of financial market history, however, we have never had negative rates until recently,[10] so we view the current situation as more the exception rather than the rule. Money isn't supposed to be free. The era of *return-free* risk will eventually end. If rates go up, growth stocks will feel the pinch.

<u>To Beat the Market, You Need to Do Something Different</u>

In recent years, growth stocks have outperformed in a rising bull market (March 2009 – February 2020), a COVID-19 bear market (February – May 2020), and a subsequent recovery. However, even after a decade of dominance, the returns for growth stocks still pale in comparison over the long run. Since inception (12/31/74), the MSCI EAFE Value Index has more than doubled its growth counterpart, with a return of 7,593% (10.01% compounded annually) vs. 3,696% (8.32%), respectively. Value investing is contrarian in nature and, as a result, can fall out of favor over long periods of time. As the chart to the right illustrates,[11] the sentiment around value stocks could not be much worse than it is today. Nonetheless, to beat the market you need to do something different than the market. Buying unloved, undervalued businesses with a margin of safety *does work*, and it's been proven over time.



[10] Jeff Cox. "$12 trillion of QE and the lowest rates in 5,000 years...for this?" *CNBC.com*. June 13, 2016.

[11] Michael Hartnett, Jared Woodward, Shirley Wu. "The Flow Show." *BofA Global Research*. April 23, 2020.

Looking at the valuations for the growth stocks driving the market can be informative. For example, the MSCI EAFE Growth Index, which trades at over twice the valuation of the FMI International Funds (see table below), has over 100 stocks valued at more than 6 times price-to-sales (P/S), or 23% of the index. In comparison, the FMI International Funds have only one stock that trades at over 4 *times* P/S, and three holdings that trade at less than 6 *times* price-to-trailing earnings – Jardine Strategic, CK Hutchison, and Hyundai Motor. At a wide enough valuation spread, the risk-to-reward will eventually become too compelling to overlook. We think we are already there today – to us there's little to debate. Buy Samsung Electronics at around 10 times forward earnings, or ASML at 39 times? LG Household & Health Care at 14 times, or L'Oreal at 38 times? B&M European Value Retail at 16 times, or Fast Retailing at 42 times? Lloyds Banking at 11 times, or London Stock Exchange at 35 times? These seem like no brainers. At some point the market will wake up.

Weighted Average Valuations*	Valuation Premium to FMIJX (6/30/20)		
	iShares MSCI EAFE	iShares MSCI EAFE Value	iShares MSCI EAFE Growth
P/E (1 Year Trailing)	32%	-8%	78%
P/E (1 Year Forward)	9%	-19%	37%
P/S	140%	20%	267%
EV/EBITDA	53%	-4%	100%
Average Premium	***59%***	***-3%***	***121%***

** Estimated valuations for FMI and the iShares are weighted average valuation calculations, not reweighted to exclude cash, and financial companies are excluded from the EV/EBITDA calculation. Valuations for both the portfolio and the ETF are modified based on criteria identified by FMI. For more detailed information regarding these valuations, please contact FMI.*

As can be seen in the table, the FMI International Fund trades at a significant discount to the MSCI EAFE and EAFE Growth indices, and in-line with the MSCI EAFE Value Index. Compared with the value index, we believe our companies are stronger, with better growth prospects, return profiles (returns on invested capital, and on equity) and balance sheets.

While investors have thrown caution to the wind on valuations, rank speculation caused by easy money will not be sustainable. We do not know what will cause growth's long reign to topple, but we have high conviction that it will in the fullness of time. For example, will people return to more sensible views on valuation? Will rising rates cause investors to rethink their discount rates? Will growth stock expectations disappoint and collapse under their own weight (they are tethered to the same economy, after all)? Will central banks finally take their foot off the gas? Will we see a credit crisis, where speculative borrowers are no longer awarded a free pass? Will there be a reversion to the mean (a recovery in value multiples or a decline in growth multiples), like so many other periods in the past? It remains to be seen, but we take comfort in knowing that there are several paths that could lead to value's resurgence. In the meantime, we are investing right alongside our shareholders and will continue to stick to our discipline. With patience comes great reward.

Thank you for your support of the FMI International Funds.

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 96.1% (a)		
COMMON STOCKS — 85.9% (a)		
COMMERCIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 9.9%		
	Advertising/Marketing Services — 1.8%	
8,895,000	WPP PLC (Jersey)	$ 69,348,012
	Miscellaneous Commercial Services — 6.6%	
2,785,000	Bureau Veritas S.A. (France)*	59,068,036
1,836,000	DKSH Holding AG (Switzerland)	118,289,627
851,000	Secom Co. Ltd. (Japan)	74,669,037
		252,026,700
	Personnel Services — 1.5%	
1,197,300	Adecco Group AG (Switzerland)	56,435,450
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR — 1.3%		
	Wireless Telecommunications — 1.3%	
1,960,000	Millicom International Cellular S.A. (Luxembourg)	51,254,000
CONSUMER DURABLES SECTOR — 4.1%		
	Electronics/Appliances — 4.1%	
2,255,000	Sony Corp. (Japan)	155,663,055
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES SECTOR — 8.5%		
	Food: Major Diversified — 1.5%	
523,000	Nestlé S.A. — SP-ADR (Switzerland)	57,985,337
	Household/Personal Care — 7.0%	
1,420,000	Henkel AG & Co. KGaA (Germany)	118,797,164
2,700,000	Unilever PLC (Britain)	145,640,410
		264,437,574
CONSUMER SERVICES SECTOR — 15.0%		
	Broadcasting — 0.9%	
6,600,000	Grupo Televisa S.A.B. — SP-ADR (Mexico)*	34,584,000
	Cable/Satellite TV — 1.2%	
2,865,000	Shaw Communications Inc. (Canada)	46,722,967
	Media Conglomerates — 3.2%	
4,750,000	Vivendi S.A. (France)	122,737,992
	Movies/Entertainment — 1.9%	
23,443,000	Bolloré (France)	73,970,977
	Other Consumer Services — 4.0%	
95,000	Booking Holdings Inc. (United States)*	151,272,300
	Restaurants — 3.8%	
4,800,000	Compass Group PLC (Britain)	66,040,373
2,908,000	Whitbread PLC (Britain)	80,006,127
		146,046,500
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES SECTOR — 5.6%		
	Wholesale Distributors — 5.6%	
2,600,000	Ferguson PLC (Jersey)	212,592,330

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 96.1% (a) (Continued)		
COMMON STOCKS — 85.9% (a) (Continued)		
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 5.4%		
	Aerospace & Defense — 3.3%	
1,236,650	Safran S.A. (France)*	$ 124,395,649
	Electronic Equipment/Instruments — 2.1%	
5,000,000	Yokogawa Electric Corp. (Japan)	78,343,437
FINANCE SECTOR — 7.4%		
	Major Banks — 1.6%	
157,000,000	Lloyds Banking Group PLC (Britain)	60,564,174
	Property/Casualty Insurance — 5.8%	
1,028,000	Chubb Ltd. (Switzerland)	130,165,360
288,000	Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. (Canada)	88,977,490
		219,142,850
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 5.6%		
	Medical Specialties — 5.6%	
2,750,000	Koninklijke Philips N.V. (Netherlands)*	128,473,717
4,530,000	Smith & Nephew PLC (Britain)	84,410,104
		212,883,821
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 1.7%		
	Oilfield Services/Equipment — 1.7%	
3,470,000	Schlumberger Ltd. (Curacao)	63,813,300
PROCESS INDUSTRIES SECTOR — 2.5%		
	Industrial Specialties — 2.5%	
1,075,000	Akzo Nobel N.V. (Netherlands)	96,578,221
PRODUCER MANUFACTURING SECTOR — 5.1%		
	Industrial Conglomerates — 3.5%	
7,715,000	Smiths Group PLC (Britain)	134,872,547
	Trucks/Construction/Farm Machinery — 1.6%	
8,620,000	CNH Industrial N.V. (Netherlands)*	60,560,458
RETAIL TRADE SECTOR — 10.2%		
	Department Stores — 4.6%	
35,175,000	B&M European Value Retail S.A. (Luxembourg)	173,145,041
	Specialty Stores — 5.6%	
16,375,000	CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. (Cayman Islands)	106,037,739
4,910,000	Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd. (Bermuda)	105,914,086
		211,951,825
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SECTOR — 2.1%		
	Information Technology Services — 2.1%	
366,000	Accenture PLC (Ireland)	78,587,520
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR — 1.5%		
	Air Freight/Couriers — 1.5%	
750,000	Expeditors International of Washington Inc. (United States)	57,030,000
	Total common stocks	3,266,946,037

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 96.1% (a) (Continued)		
PREFERRED STOCKS — 10.2% (a)		
CONSUMER DURABLES SECTOR — 1.0%		
	Motor Vehicles — 1.0%	
781,244	Hyundai Motor Co. (South Korea)	$ 37,355,816
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES SECTOR — 4.1%		
	Household/Personal Care — 4.1%	
1,256,930	Amorepacific Corp. (South Korea)	74,872,108
134,830	LG Household & Health Care Ltd. (South Korea)	81,681,097
		156,553,205
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 5.1%		
	Telecommunications Equipment — 5.1%	
5,015,000	Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (South Korea)	195,355,838
	Total preferred stocks	389,264,859
	Total long-term investments	3,656,210,896
Principal Amount		
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS — 4.9% (a)		
	Bank Deposit Account — 4.9%	
$185,915,791	U.S. Bank N.A., 0.09%^	185,915,791
	Total short-term investments	185,915,791
	Total investments — 101.0%	3,842,126,687
	Other assets, less liabilities — **(1.0%) (a)**	(39,002,152)
	TOTAL NET ASSETS — 100.0%	$3,803,124,535
	Investor Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($1,408,837,444 ÷ 53,178,382 shares outstanding)	$ 26.49
	Institutional Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($2,394,287,091 ÷ 90,256,813 shares outstanding)	$ 26.53

* Non-income producing security.
^ The rate shown is as of June 30, 2020.
(a) Percentages for the various classifications relate to total net assets.
(b) Each security is valued at the current day last sale price reported by the principal security exchange on which the issue is traded. Securities that are traded on Nasdaq Markets are valued at the Nasdaq Official Closing Price, or if no sale is reported, the latest bid price. Securities that are traded over-the-counter, including U.S. Treasury securities are valued at the close price, if not close, then at the latest bid price. Bank deposits are valued at acquisition cost which approximates fair value. For securities that do not trade during New York Stock Exchange hours, fair value determinations are based on analyses of market movements after the close of those securities' primary markets, and may include reviews of developments in foreign markets, the performance of U.S. securities markets, and the performance of instruments trading in U.S. markets that represent foreign securities and baskets of foreign securities. The Board of Directors utilizes a service provided by an independent third party to assist in fair valuation of certain securities.
PLC Public Limited Company
SP-ADR Sponsored American Depositary Receipt

SCHEDULE OF FORWARD CURRENCY CONTRACTS

June 30, 2020 (Unaudited)

Settlement Date	Counterparty	Currency to be Delivered	U.S. $ Value on June 30, 2020 of Currency to be Delivered	Currency to be Received	U.S. $ Value on June 30, 2020 of Currency to be Received	Unrealized Appreciation (Depreciation)
7/17/20	State Street Bank and Trust Co.	785,000,000 British Pound	$ 972,805,886	968,187,600 U.S. Dollar	$ 968,187,600	$ (4,618,286)
7/17/20	JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.	185,000,000 Canadian Dollar	136,276,827	130,781,330 U.S. Dollar	130,781,330	(5,495,497)
7/17/20	The Bank of New York Mellon	565,000,000 Euro	635,017,127	612,892,225 U.S. Dollar	612,892,225	(22,124,902)
7/17/20	The Bank of New York Mellon	860,000,000 Hong Kong Dollar	110,951,714	110,849,026 U.S. Dollar	110,849,026	(102,688)
7/17/20	JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.	29,000,000,000 Japanese Yen	268,638,064	269,548,042 U.S. Dollar	269,548,042	909,978
7/17/20	The Bank of New York Mellon	480,000,000 Mexican Peso	20,834,262	19,292,605 U.S. Dollar	19,292,605	(1,541,657)
7/17/20	State Street Bank and Trust Co.	440,000,000,000 South Korea Won	365,814,557	357,026,939 U.S. Dollar	357,026,939	(8,787,618)
7/17/20	JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.	230,000,000 Swiss Franc	242,884,885	237,407,102 U.S. Dollar	237,407,102	(5,477,783)
			$2,753,223,322		$2,705,984,869	$(47,238,453)

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 90.9% (a)		
COMMON STOCKS — 81.9% (a)		
COMMERCIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 9.5%		
	Advertising/Marketing Services — 1.7%	
70,350	WPP PLC (Jersey)	$ 548,469
	Miscellaneous Commercial Services — 6.3%	
22,300	Bureau Veritas S.A. (France)*	472,969
14,600	DKSH Holding AG (Switzerland)	940,647
6,700	Secom Co. Ltd. (Japan)	587,876
		2,001,492
	Personnel Services — 1.5%	
9,800	Adecco Group AG (Switzerland)	461,929
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR — 1.2%		
	Wireless Telecommunications — 1.2%	
14,975	Millicom International Cellular S.A. (Luxembourg)	391,596
CONSUMER DURABLES SECTOR — 4.0%		
	Electronics/Appliances — 4.0%	
18,300	Sony Corp. (Japan)	1,263,252
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES SECTOR — 8.0%		
	Food: Major Diversified — 1.5%	
4,175	Nestlé S.A. (Switzerland)	462,885
	Household/Personal Care — 6.5%	
11,375	Henkel AG & Co. KGaA (Germany)	951,632
20,500	Unilever PLC (Britain)	1,105,788
		2,057,420
CONSUMER SERVICES SECTOR — 14.5%		
	Broadcasting — 0.8%	
49,725	Grupo Televisa S.A.B. — SP-ADR (Mexico)*	260,559
	Cable/Satellite TV — 1.2%	
23,075	Shaw Communications Inc. (Canada)	376,312
	Media Conglomerates — 3.1%	
38,000	Vivendi S.A. (France)	981,904
	Movies/Entertainment — 1.8%	
183,900	Bolloré (France)	580,270
	Other Consumer Services — 3.9%	
770	Booking Holdings Inc. (United States)*	1,226,102
	Restaurants — 3.7%	
39,000	Compass Group PLC (Britain)	536,578
23,050	Whitbread PLC (Britain)	634,161
		1,170,739
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES SECTOR — 5.4%		
	Wholesale Distributors — 5.4%	
20,800	Ferguson PLC (Jersey)	1,700,739

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 90.9% (a) (Continued)		
COMMON STOCKS — 81.9% (a) (Continued)		
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 5.1%		
	Aerospace & Defense — 3.2%	
9,900	Safran S.A. (France)*	$ 995,849
	Electronic Equipment/Instruments — 1.9%	
38,700	Yokogawa Electric Corp. (Japan)	606,378
FINANCE SECTOR — 7.1%		
	Major Banks — 1.5%	
1,248,000	Lloyds Banking Group PLC (Britain)	481,427
	Property/Casualty Insurance — 5.6%	
8,200	Chubb Ltd. (Switzerland)	1,038,284
2,325	Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. (Canada)	718,308
		1,756,592
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 5.4%		
	Medical Specialties — 5.4%	
21,925	Koninklijke Philips N.V. (Netherlands)*	1,024,286
36,000	Smith & Nephew PLC (Britain)	670,809
		1,695,095
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES SECTOR — 1.6%		
	Oilfield Services/Equipment — 1.6%	
27,800	Schlumberger Ltd. (Curacao)	511,242
PROCESS INDUSTRIES SECTOR — 2.4%		
	Industrial Specialties — 2.4%	
8,550	Akzo Nobel N.V. (Netherlands)	768,134
PRODUCER MANUFACTURING SECTOR — 4.9%		
	Industrial Conglomerates — 3.4%	
62,025	Smiths Group PLC (Britain)	1,084,312
	Trucks/Construction/Farm Machinery — 1.5%	
68,450	CNH Industrial N.V. (Netherlands)*	480,901
RETAIL TRADE SECTOR — 9.4%		
	Department Stores — 4.3%	
278,525	B&M European Value Retail S.A. (Luxembourg)	1,371,008
	Specialty Stores — 5.1%	
125,000	CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. (Cayman Islands)	809,448
37,000	Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd. (Bermuda)	798,131
		1,607,579
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SECTOR — 2.0%		
	Information Technology Services — 2.0%	
2,925	Accenture PLC (Ireland)	628,056
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR — 1.4%		
	Air Freight/Couriers — 1.4%	
5,800	Expeditors International of Washington Inc. (United States)	441,032
	Total common stocks	25,911,273

Shares		Value (b)
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS — 90.9% (a) (Continued)		
PREFERRED STOCKS — 9.0% (a)		
CONSUMER DURABLES SECTOR — 0.8%		
	Motor Vehicles — 0.8%	
5,500	Hyundai Motor Co. (South Korea)	$ 262,987
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES SECTOR — 3.5%		
	Household/Personal Care — 3.5%	
7,875	Amorepacific Corp. (South Korea)	469,094
1,050	LG Household & Health Care Ltd. (South Korea)	636,098
		1,105,192
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY SECTOR — 4.7%		
	Telecommunications Equipment — 4.7%	
38,300	Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (South Korea)	1,491,950
	Total preferred stocks	2,860,129
	Total long-term investments	28,771,402
Principal Amount		
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS — 9.0% (a)		
	Bank Deposit Account — 9.0%	
$2,836,369	U.S. Bank N.A., 0.09%^	2,836,369
	Total short-term investments	2,836,369
	Total investments — 99.9%	31,607,771
	Other assets, less liabilities — **0.1% (a)**	50,194
	TOTAL NET ASSETS — 100.0%	$31,657,965
	Institutional Class — Net Asset Value Per Share ($0.0001 par value, 300,000,000 shares authorized), offering and redemption price ($31,657,965 ÷ 1,957,733 shares outstanding)	$ 16.17

* Non-income producing security.
^ The rate shown is as of June 30, 2020.
(a) Percentages for the various classifications relate to total net assets.
(b) Each security is valued at the current day last sale price reported by the principal security exchange on which the issue is traded. Securities that are traded on Nasdaq Markets are valued at the Nasdaq Official Closing Price, or if no sale is reported, the latest bid price. Securities that are traded over-the-counter, including U.S. Treasury securities are valued at the close price, if not close, then at the latest bid price. Bank deposits are valued at acquisition cost which approximates fair value. For securities that do not trade during New York Stock Exchange hours, fair value determinations are based on analyses of market movements after the close of those securities' primary markets, and may include reviews of developments in foreign markets, the performance of U.S. securities markets, and the performance of instruments trading in U.S. markets that represent foreign securities and baskets of foreign securities. The Board of Directors utilizes a service provided by an independent third party to assist in fair valuation of certain securities.
PLC Public Limited Company
SP-ADR Sponsored American Depositary Receipt

Performance for Period Ended June 30, 2020

			Average Annual Total Returns				
FMI FUND / INDEX	**3 Months[1]**	**1 Year**	**3 Year**	**5 Year**	**10 Year**	**Since Inception**	**Inception Date**
Large Cap – Investor Class	15.47%	-6.23%	4.90%	6.40%	10.82%	8.30%	12-31-01
S&P 500	20.54%	7.51%	10.73%	10.73%	13.99%	7.67%	12-31-01
Russell 1000 Value	14.29%	-8.84%	1.82%	4.64%	10.41%	6.54%	12-31-01
Large Cap – Institutional Class	15.49%	-6.12%	5.04%	—	—	8.54%	10-31-16
S&P 500	20.54%	7.51%	10.73%	10.73%	13.99%	13.10%	10-31-16
Russell 1000 Value	14.29%	-8.84%	1.82%	4.64%	10.41%	5.04%	10-31-16
Common Stock – Investor Class	14.42%	-13.78%	0.73%	3.76%	9.14%	11.09%	12-18-81
Russell 2000	25.42%	-6.63%	2.01%	4.29%	10.50%	9.77%	12-18-81
Russell 2000 Value	18.91%	-17.48%	-4.35%	1.26%	7.82%	10.80%	12-18-81
Common Stock – Institutional Class	14.52%	-13.65%	0.84%	—	—	5.20%	10-31-16
Russell 2000	25.42%	-6.63%	2.01%	4.29%	10.50%	6.82%	10-31-16
Russell 2000 Value	18.91%	-17.48%	-4.35%	1.26%	7.82%	1.02%	10-31-16
International – Investor Class	14.08%	-13.93%	-2.89%	1.47%	—	5.89%	12-31-10
MSCI EAFE Net (USD)	14.88%	-5.13%	0.81%	2.05%	5.73%	3.65%	12-31-10
MSCI EAFE Net (LOC)	12.60%	-4.24%	1.26%	2.63%	6.86%	5.85%	12-31-10
MSCI EAFE Value Net (USD)	12.43%	-14.48%	-4.43%	-1.59%	3.53%	1.53%	12-31-10
International – Institutional Class	14.11%	-13.79%	-2.74%	—	—	0.77%	10-31-16
MSCI EAFE Net (USD)	14.88%	-5.13%	0.81%	2.05%	5.73%	4.67%	10-31-16
MSCI EAFE Net (LOC)	12.60%	-4.24%	1.26%	2.63%	6.86%	4.66%	10-31-16
MSCI EAFE Value Net (USD)	12.43%	-14.48%	-4.43%	-1.59%	3.53%	0.22%	10-31-16
International II – Currency Unhedged – Institutional Class	14.28%	—	—	—	—	-19.15%[1]	12-31-19
MSCI EAFE Net (USD)	14.88%	-5.13%	0.81%	2.05%	5.73%	-11.34%[1]	12-31-19
MSCI EAFE Value Net (USD)	12.43%	-14.48%	-4.43%	-1.59%	3.53%	-19.27%[1]	12-31-19

[1] Returns for periods less than one year are not annualized.

Performance data quoted represents past performance; past performance does not guarantee future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of a Fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. Performance data current to the most recent month end may be obtained by visiting www.fmifunds.com or by calling 1-800-811-5311. The returns do not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Securities named in the Letters to Shareholders, but not listed in the Statements of Net Assets are not held in the Funds as of the date of this disclosure. Portfolio holdings are subject to change without notice and are not intended as recommendations of individual securities.

This report is not authorized for use as an offer of sale or a solicitation of an offer to buy shares of the Funds unless accompanied or preceded by the Funds' current prospectus.

As of the Funds' Prospectus dated January 31, 2020, the annual operating expense ratios for the Investor Class of FMI Large Cap Fund, FMI Common Stock Fund and FMI International Fund are: 0.80%, 1.01% and 0.90%, respectively. The annual operating expense ratios for the Institutional Class of FMI Large Cap Fund, FMI Common Stock Fund, FMI International Fund and FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged are: 0.67%, 0.90%, 0.76% and 0.90%*, respectively.

* Note that the annual operating expenses for the Institutional Class of FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged are 1.80% before the investment adviser's voluntary reimbursement such that annual fund operating expenses do not exceed 0.90%, which will continue at least through January 31, 2021.

Risks associated with investing in the Funds are as follows:

FMI Large Cap Fund: Stock Market Risk, Medium and Large Capitalization Companies Risks, Non-Diversification Risk (Non-Diversified funds are subject to higher volatility than funds that are invested more broadly), Value Investing Risk, Foreign Securities Risk (fluctuation of currency, different financial standards, and political instability) and Liquidity Risk.

FMI Common Stock Fund: Stock Market Risk, Medium and Small Capitalization Companies Risks (which includes the potential for greater volatility and less financial resources than Large-Cap Companies), Value Investing Risk, Foreign Securities Risk (fluctuation of currency, different financial standards, and political instability) and Liquidity Risk.

FMI International Fund: Stock Market Risk, Non-Diversification Risk (Non-Diversified funds are subject to higher volatility than funds that are invested more broadly), Value Investing Risk, Foreign Securities Risk (fluctuation of currency, different financial standards, and political instability), Geographic Concentration Risk, Currency Hedging Risk, Large Capitalization Companies Risk and Liquidity Risk.

FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged: Stock Market Risk, Non-Diversified Risk (Non-Diversified Funds are subject to higher volatility than funds that are invested more broadly). Value Investing Risk, Foreign Securities Risk (fluctuation of currency, different financial standards, and political instability), Geographic Concentration Risk, Large Capitalization Companies Risk, and Liquidity Risk.

For details regarding these risks, please refer to the Funds' Summary or Statutory Prospectuses dated January 31, 2020.

For more information about the FMI Funds, call 1-800-811-5311 for a free Prospectus or Summary Prospectus. Please read these Prospectuses carefully to consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses, before investing or sending money. These Prospectuses contain this and more information about the FMI Funds. Please read the Prospectuses or Summary Prospectuses carefully before investing.

The Standard and Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) consists of 500 selected common stocks, most of which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The S&P's Ratings Group designates the stocks to be included in the Index on a statistical basis. A particular stock's weighting in the Index is based on its relative total market value (i.e., its market price per share times the number of shares outstanding). Stocks may be added or deleted from the Index from time to time. The S&P 500 Energy Sector Index, S&P 500 Financial Sector Index, and S&P 500 Industrials Sector Index are comprised of the S&P 500 companies with a corresponding GICS sector classification.

The Russell 1000 Index measures the performance of the 1,000 largest companies in the Russell 3000 Index which comprises the 3,000 largest U.S. companies based on total market capitalization. The Russell 1000 Value Index includes equities that exhibit value characteristics and the Russell 1000 Growth Index includes equities that exhibit growth characteristics.

The Russell 2000 Index measures the performance of the 2,000 smallest companies in the Russell 3000 Index which comprises the 3,000 largest U.S. companies based on total market capitalization. The Russell 2000 Value Index includes equities that exhibit value characteristics and the Russell 2000 Growth Index includes equities that exhibit growth characteristics.

The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets, excluding the U.S. and Canada. The MSCI EAFE Index consists of the following 21 developed market country indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Index results are inclusive of dividends and net of foreign withholding taxes. The reported figures include reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions and do not reflect any fees or expenses.

The MSCI EAFE Index is calculated in local currency (LOC) as well as in U.S. Dollars (USD). The concept of a LOC calculation excludes the impact of currency fluctuations. All currencies of listing are considered in the Index calculation in LOC where current prices (t) and previous day prices (t-1) are converted into USD using the same exchange rate (exchange rate t-1) in the numerator and denominator. As a consequence, the FX factor drops out of the equation. The USD calculation includes exchange rates at t and t-1. Therefore, the LOC calculation only represents the price appreciation or depreciation of the securities, whereas the USD calculation also accounts for the performance of the currency (or currencies) relative to the USD.

The MSCI EAFE Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across Developed Markets countries around the world, excluding the U.S. and Canada. The value investment style characteristics for index construction are defined using three variables: book value to price, 12-month forward earnings to price and dividend yield.

The MSCI EAFE Growth Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall growth style characteristics across Developed Markets countries around the world, excluding the U.S. and Canada. The growth investment style characteristics for index construction are defined using five variables: long-term forward EPS growth rate, short-term forward EPS growth rate, current internal growth rate and long-term historical EPS growth trend and long-term historical sales per share growth trend.

The MSCI USA Momentum Index is a subset of the MSCI USA Index, which captures large and mid cap stocks of the US market. The MSCI USA Momentum Index is designed to reflect the performance of an equity momentum strategy by emphasizing stocks with high price momentum, while maintaining reasonably high trading liquidity, investment capacity and moderate index turnover.

The MSCI USA Value Index captures large and mid cap US securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics as determined by book value to price, 12-month forward earnings to price and dividend yield.

MSCI EAFE and MSCI USA are service marks of MSCI Barra.

The NASDAQ Composite Index measures all domestic and international based stocks listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market, comprised of over 2,500 companies.

The NYSE FANG Plus Index is an equal weighted index composed of Facebook, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Netflix, Tesla, NVIDIA, Alibaba, Baidu, and Twitter.

All indices are unmanaged. These indices are used herein for comparative purposes in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. It is not possible to invest directly into an index.

GLOSSARY

EV/EBITDA – Enterprise Value to Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization – a measure of the value of a stock that compares a company's enterprise value (market cap plus debt, minority interest and preferred shares, minus total cash and cash equivalents) to its earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. EV/EBITDA is one of several fundamental indicators that investors use to determine whether a stock is priced well. The EV/EBITDA multiple is also often used to determine a company's valuation in the case of a potential acquisition.

FCF – Free cash flow – a measure of a company's financial performance, calculated as operating cash flow minus capital expenditures, Free cash flow represents the cash that a company is able to generate after spending the money required to maintain or expand its asset base.

GDP – Gross Domestic Product – the monetary value of all finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.

P/E ratio – Price-to-earnings ratio – the ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share price relative to its per-share earnings.

P/S ratio – Price-to-sales ratio – a valuation ratio that compares a company's stock price to its revenues. The price-to-sales ratio is an indicator of the value placed on each dollar of a company's sales or revenues. It can be calculated either by dividing the company's market capitalization by its total sales over a 12-month period, or on a per-share basis by dividing the stock price by sales per share for a 12-month period.

ROIC – Return on Invested Capital – a calculation used to assess a company's efficiency at allocating the capital under its control to profitable investments. The return on invested capital measure gives a sense of how well a company is using its money to generate returns.

Reference definitions found at Investopedia.com

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FMI Large Cap Fund | FMI Common Stock Fund | FMI International Fund | FMI International Fund II – Currency Unhedged

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